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Sections on Notes and Documents complete the Yearbook.' Illustrative
titles in the Notes are "Immigrant Ships before the Palestine Courts" and
"Post-War Legislation against Racial Hatred." The Documents secti6n is
devoted to United Nations materials, namely, the Resolution on the Future
Government of Palestine, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the Genocide Convention.
A few of the papers in the Yearbook leave the impression of being
thorough, but strained, briefs for particular points of view that in some
cases may have become outdated, as it were, by the emergence of the State
of Israel. Perhaps the opinion voiced by the editors that those international law questions affecting the Jewish people are of a sui generis character might be re-examined. These are minor points. On the whole, the
initial volume of the Jewish Yearbook contains valuable materials for the
student of international law and relations on the international background
and aspects of the creation of the State of Israel.
DAVID R. DEENER.

Duke University.
Third Edition. By Herbert F.
Goodrich, assisted by Paul A. Wolkin. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1949. Pp. xix, 729. $6.50.
The successive editions of Judge Goodrich's Handbook have remained
wedded to a single basic point of view. The territorial-vested rights analysis of conflict of laws problems is common to the first edition of Judge
Goodrich's Handbook, Professor Beale's treatise, and the American Law
Institute's Restatement. In spite of the searching criticisms given the
theory underlying these works, the second edition of the Handbook published
in 1938 showed no substantial change in point of view. The author held
fast to his basic position. Now, save for a few verbal changes, the new,
third edition has again built on the framework of vested rights conceptions.
Changes in phraseology throughout the new edition indicate that judge
Goodrich wishes to throw off the incubus of Bealeism. Those passages in
the second edition which were most explicit in revealing judge Goodrich's
fundamental orientation have been rewritten and much of the terminology
discarded. For example we are no longer told:
. . . it is a principle of civilized law that rights once vested under
HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:

the law continue until destroyed or cut off by law, and that such rights
are recognized and enforced in one state though they have come into
being in another, unless such enforcement, is for good reason, thought
contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction where enforcement is
sought.1

But rather:
. . . it is a principle of civilized law that a court will not resolve
a dispute before it which involves foreign elements as if it were deciding a case all of the facts of which occurred in its own state. It will,
instead, look to the law of the other state or states involved, and consonant with other considerations that may be of concern, seek a result
conforming to that law. 2
1 HERtBERT F.
2P. 14.

GOODRICH, HANDnOOH OF THE CosrFLicT or LAws 11 (2d ed. 1938).
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In the second edition the reason given for a system of conflicts rules was:
The rights acquired in Pennsylvania should not be changed by the fact
that for one reason or another enforcement of them -by legal action Is
presented somewhere else than at the place where the operative facts
were located. Nor should the defendant's obligations, as thus fixed, be
changed, either by being increased or diminished by this fact.3
Now the reason is said to be:
The outcome of litigation involving the former should not be changed
by the fact that for one reason or another legal action Is instituted
somewhere else than at the place where the operative facts were lo1cated. 4
In several places the second edition spoke of "foreign acquired rights" a
or a "right acquired under the law of another state." 6 The third edition has
changed the phrases to read "claim founded on foreign operative facts" 7 or
"claim [arising] from operative facts in another state." 8
Yet "jurisdiction" is still defined as "the power of a state, through its
courts, to create rights which, under principles of the common law of Conflict of Laws will be recognized as valid in other states." 9 The "place of
the wrong" must supply us with the law to be applied in the case of a tort
because the rule is "sound upon principle." 10 It is incorrect for an English
court to allow civil recovery for a libel published in Brazil when under
Brazilian law the defendant would have been only subject to a criminal
sanction: "The plaintiff, in such a case, has acquired no claim which should
be enforced by action in the second state." 1 In treating the sharply disputed choice of law rules governing contracts the author tells us that the place
of contracting rule is "theoretically sound" because "As in torts, the parties
engage in certain conduct in place [sic] where there are laws which determine the consequences of that conduct." n The place of performance rule
involves a "theoretical difficulty." If the acts constituting offer and acceptance occur in Michigan and Ohio is the place of performance, Ohio
law will be used to determine the effect of acts in Michigan. "That the law
of Ohio cannot thus extend into Michigan's territory is fundamental." 11
Certain foreign statutes of limitations will be applied in the forum if they
"destroy the right itself." In such cases the "law which has created the
right has taken it away." 14 The most troublesome questions of conflicts
are analyzed in the same way as in earlier editions of the Handbook. The
new mode of expression adopted in the present edition does not reflect a
new treatment of the subject matter. Judge Goodrich's line has been
3 Goomucn, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 6-6.
4P. 7.
5 GooDRicH, op. oit. supra,note 1, at 20.
6Id. at 14.
7 P. 21.
8 P. 29. Changes of the sort indicated have been made throughout the present

work.
9P.167.
lop. 261.

1P. 262.
12 P. 322.
'13 p. 324.
14

P. 242.
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slightly bent but by no means broken. The new words merely make it
more difficult for a student to be aware of the author's premises.
Given the basic similarity to older editions, this version does of course
contain some changes other than the obvious one of adding recent citations.
Some of the less controversial matters may be listed. The footnotes are
no longer "keyed" to Lorenzen's casebook, and a Table of Restatement Citations has been added at the back of the book. The only significant new
sections appear in the first chapter, where three additions have been made.
The section on Reason for Conflict of Laws Rules is created by merely
separating the earlier section entitled Present Day Importance into two
parts. Conflict of Laws Theories is actually a two-paragraph digest of an
article by Professor Cheatham. 15 A section on Characterizations appears
for the first time and here Judge Goodrich sets down the generally used
tripartite division of the problem and concludes that in general the law
of the forum is to be used to characterize. The characterization problem
1
does not seem to be touched on again throughout the rest of the volume. a
Decisions of the Supreme Court made it necessary to rewrite considerable
portions of the material on Taxation, Jurisdiction of Courts and Foreign
Judgments. A rather extended discussion of the law to be applied in the
federal courts-the Erie v. Tompkins problem-is now found in the introductory chapter. New material has required few textual changes in the
chapters on Domicil, Marriage, Matrimonial Property, Legitimation, Property, Inheritance, and Administration of Estates.
A section entitled Supreme Court Supervision 6f State Conflict of Laws.
Decisions which made its appearance in the second edition is retained in the
present volume without important change. In it the point is made that some
federal supervision of state choice of law rules is possible under the Due
Process Clause. But no case later than 1934 is cited or discussed on this
due process point although some of the cases cited should be re-examined
in the light of the 1943 case, Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen.17 -Furthermore the reader receives no hint of the considerable present-day reluctance
on the part of the Supreme Court to review any state law (other than a civil
liberties matter) on the ground of the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely this
general development is relevant in considering whether any significant
federal control of state conflicts rules is likely to occur on constitutional
grounds.
Since 1948 a question has arisen whether the Supreme Court may control
a state court in the conflicts area on federal statutory grounds. The Handbook, however, does not mention this most recently created problem. While
the Constitution requires full faith and credit to be given the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of a sister state, until 1948 the statute implementing the constitutional provision spoke only of records and judicial
proceedings and the effect to be given them, i.e., such effect as they have in
the state from which they were taken. Congress had never undertaken to,
determine the faith and credit to which a statute was entitled. At times
1

15 Oheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 5&
HAn.RL.REV. 361 (1945), cited at p. 10 n.16.

16 Except in Section 81, p. 228, where it is said that the law of the forum determines whether a question is one of substance or procedure.
17 318 U.S. 313, 63 Sup.Ct. 602, 87 L.Ed. 777 (1943).
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the Court has seemed to base the different treatment given judgments and
state statutes in full faith and credit cases on this absence of a congressional direction as to the mandatory extra-state effect of a statute. Mr.
Justice Douglas adverted to the distinction in the first Williams case.' 8
States may disregard the statutes of sister states more freely than judgments: "This Court, to be sure, has recognized that in case of statutes, 'the
extra-state effect of which Congress has not prescribed,' some 'accommodatiofi of the conflicting interests of the two states' is necessary." 19
With the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code public "Acts" were put on a
parity with "records and judicial proceedings" in the statute. 20 The change
could be the focal point for a very considerable increase in Supreme Court
interference with state conflicts rules. Of course no one knows what the
change will mean, but some indication of the new problem should be made
in a book which raises the general question, even though the book is a
hornbook. It cannot be assumed that the Code revision appeared too late
for reference to it in the third edition. Citation to the revision is made in
other connections.2 1

When a new edition has made few changes and earlier versions of the
work have been so widely reviewed, perhaps there is no need for a new
reaction to what is already so well known. However, the temptation is
tqo great.
Judge Goodrich's Handbook is designed principally for students, most
of whom are meeting the conflict of laws for the first time. Is this book
then satisfactory for the purposes of those for whom it is principally intended? Not in the opinion of this reviewer. A study of the book (without
a great deal more) will not give a student sufficient insight into the principal
clashes of theory in the subject. He will find seemingly easy, systematic
answers to the most puzzling questions. 22 On the other hand, he will look
in vain for trustworthy guides to advance the solution of complex issues. In
studying the Handbook a student would gain only the slightest acquaintance
with the contributions which comparative law can make to the conflict of
18 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 Sup.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942).
19 Id. at 295.
20The relevant section of the Code now reads: "Such acts, records, and judicial

proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1940). The Reviser's Notes merely state:
At the beginning of the last paragraph, words "Such Acts" were substituted for
"And the said." This follows the language of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
21 B. g., p. 609 n.22, which reads in part: "The provisions of the new Title 28 of
the United States Code, effective in 1948, on full faith and credit modified details
of the earlier provisions.
. . . The Constitution requires full faith and credit to be given to the public
acts, as well as to the records and judicial proceedings of other states. Although
Congress has not prescribed the effect to be given statutes in other states, as It did
in the case of records and judgments, this has not prevented the Supreme Court from
requiring their recognition; with regard to statutes, the Court has apparently considered the clause self-executing."
22 The very interesting California case, In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal.2d 472, 159 P.
2d 643 (1945), for example, is dismissed with the statement that it is "difficult to
explain." P. 436 n.8.

1950]

BOOK REVIEWS

laws. A reader still finds that "domicil" may be defined in one general way
and a person may be domiciled in only one place. Walter Wheeler Cook's
warnings in regard to the domicil concept are in no way reflected in the
work. Most of the examples used by the author to justify a given choice of
law rule are fact situations which occur within the boundaries of a single
state. The conflicts problems involved in such circumstances are few and
not of the most difficult sort.
If a libel is published in a magazine edited in New York, printed in both.
Pennsylvania and Illinois and distributed throughout the 48 states and most
of the countries of the civilized world, what law should be applied to determine the obligations of the parties? For the solution of this enormously
complicated problem the only tool which this book places at a student's
command is "the law of the place of the tort governs the tort." Where is the
place of the tort? The place of the last act necessary for tort liability.
Duller knives to cut through thick brush could hardly be imagined.
The analytical divisions of the book themselves make it difficult to perceive problems which have much in common. A student who finds the
chapter on Jurisdiction of the Courts separated from the chapter on Foreign Judgments by about 400 pages and who finds the subject of forum non
conveniens treated in the Introduction and the rule on local actions discussed
in the chapter on Torts can be pardoned for not understanding that in all
these matters there is a principal underlying question: where should judicial determinations be made?
Other reviewers have excused shortcomings such as these on the ground
that the hornbook formula does not permit the exploration of problems but
demands only a statement of "the rules as they stand." This may well be
true. So much the worse for the hornbook formula. Within the framework
of that formula Judge Goodrich's work is exceedingly well-written and admirably organized. The clarity and the skill of summarizing judicial authority, virtues so often praised by prior reviewers, are still here. Yet in
the stage of growth in which conflict of laws finds itself, reading the
Handbook cannot be the best use of a student's time. It is an organized
statement of a subject not yet suitable to organization of the sort which the
Handbook attempts. On second thought the book is more; it is a sectarian
statement. To recommend its extensive use to students would be similar to
recommending the Lutheran Catechism as the principal text in a course
on comparative religion.
MONRAD G. PAULSEN.

Indiana University.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL METHOD.

Carville D. Benson. St. Paul:
xxxvii, 899. $8.00.

By William T. Fryer and

West Publishing Company, 1949. Pp.
By William T. Fryer and CarWest Publishing Company, 1949. Pp.

CASIS AND MATEBRIALS ON LEGAL SYsTEir.

ville D. Benson. St. Paul:
xxix, 535. $7.00.

The method used until comparatively recently by most law schools in
teaching first year law students has been to plunge the new student headlong into the simultaneous study of a number of the regular first year

